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Abstract 
 
Can the quality of school management explain differences in student test scores?  In this 
paper I present the first internationally benchmarked estimates of school management quality 
in Africa (based on the “World Management Survey”). The level and distribution of 
management quality is similar to that found in other low and middle- income countries (India 
and Brazil). I combine this data with individual student panel data, and demonstrate that 
differences in school management quality matter for student value-added - a standard 
deviation difference in management is associated with a 0.06 standard deviation difference in 
test scores. Finally I contribute to understanding the role of the private sector in education in 
a low-income setting. Contrary to common perception, I find no difference between the 
quality of school management in government, private, or public-private partnership (PPP) 
schools (despite the higher level of autonomy available to them). An exception is an 
internationally-owned chain of PPP schools, which are as well managed as schools in the 
UK. 
 
 
JEL Codes: I25, I28, L33, M50, O15  
Keywords: Education, Management, School Quality, Uganda, Private Schools, Public-
Private Partnerships, NGO 
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1 Introduction 
 
Can the quality of school management explain differences in student test scores? School 
productivity varies substantially both within and between countries, and this matters. Theory 
and evidence suggest that it is the skills and knowledge acquired that lead to higher earnings, 
not just the amount of time spent in school (Hanushek 2013, Hanushek et al. 2015).  In this 
paper I first ask how much the quality of school management matters for student outcomes. I 
then consider whether differences in management quality explain differences in the 
performance of government and private schools, and finally look at what factors explain 
variation in management quality. I find that school management quality does indeed matter 
for productivity, as measured by student value-added, however there are no differences on 
average in management quality between government and private schools, leaving the private 
school premium unexplained. An important exception is a UK-owned chain of public-private 
partnership (PPP schools), which are substantially better managed than average, and this 
difference in management quality explains their performance advantage. Few other factors 
reliably predict management quality. 
 
This paper is connected to three sets of literature. First, there are now hundreds of studies 
looking at the relationships between educational inputs and school productivity. Studies 
typically find that spending on traditional inputs such as books and infrastructure explain 
little of the variation in school productivity. Instead the most important interventions for 
improving school quality are around pedagogy and governance (Glewwe and Muralidharan, 
2015). This includes studies looking at bundled packages of management support (Fryer 
2017,  Blimpo et al. 2015, Tavares 2015, Lassibille 2014, Beasley and Huillery 2014), as well 
as studies focused on specific sub-components of school management, such as monitoring (de 
Hoyos et al. 2015), teacher management (Duflo et al. 2015, Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
2011, Atherton and Kingdon 2010), and tailoring teaching to the right level of individual 
students (Pritchett and Beatty 2015, Duflo et al., 2011, Banerjee et al 2011).  
 
A second set of literature looks at the “New Empirical Economics of Management”, 
demonstrating links between new measures of management practices and productivity in a 
variety of sectors, including manufacturing, retail, healthcare, and education (Bloom et al., 
2014). Better managed manufacturing firms have higher levels of sales, sales growth, 
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profitability, and a lower chance of exit (Bloom et al., 2012b). Management quality can 
explain the productivity gap between US multinationals in Europe and non-US multinationals 
(Bloom et al., 2012b). Better managed hospitals have lower mortality rates, and this measure 
of management quality responds positively to competition (Bloom et al., 2016a).  In schools 
there is a positive correlation between measured management quality and school average test 
scores in seven different countries (Bloom et al., 2015).  
 
Third, several papers seek to identify the sources of differences in productivity between 
regular government schools and schools given increased autonomy under different public-
private partnership arrangements, known as Charter schools in the US and Academies in the 
UK (Dobbie and Fryer 2013, Angrist et al. 2013, Eyles et al. 2016). Whilst these studies do 
suggest that providing operational autonomy to schools can improve performance, this is 
within a context of a broadly functional education system that provides clear objectives and 
accountability for schools. Greater autonomy may not produce the same results if schools are 
not held accountable for their performance. Cross-country studies looking at changes in the 
level of school autonomy have found that increases in school autonomy lead to better 
performance in high income countries but worse performance in low-income countries 
(Hanushek et al. 2013, Contreras 2015). Whilst “autonomous government schools” seem to 
be better managed than average in OECD countries, there are no comparable estimates from 
developing countries1. 
 
In this paper I provide the first estimates of school management quality from sub-Saharan 
Africa using a version of the “World Management Survey”. Schools in my nationally 
representative sample of Ugandan secondary schools score on average 2.0 points on a 1 - 5 
scale, placing them above India and slightly below Brazil. I then demonstrate that 
management quality matters for results for student performance in high-stakes tests, using a 
lagged dependent variable dynamic OLS value-added framework, controlling for student 
prior attainment and school characteristics. This marks a methodological improvement upon 
previous work that looks at raw correlations between management quality and school average 
test scores. 
                                                
1 Bloom et al (2015) do look at private aided schools in India, finding them no better performing than regular 
government schools. This should not be surprising however, as these schools have much less autonomy than 
charter schools or academies. Their teachers are recruited and paid by a central government Education Service 
Commission rather than by the school, and resemble regular government schools much more than private 
schools (Kingdon, 2007).  
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I find that despite having more autonomy, private schools and PPP schools are no better 
managed than government schools. An exception is a chain of international PPP schools (run 
by the UK education NGO ‘PEAS’) that have a strong internal performance management 
framework with high stakes for head teachers. These schools are substantially (more than 1 
standard deviation) better managed than average, and perform commensurately better in 
terms of student value-added. 
 
Finally, conceiving of management as a technology (Bloom et al., 2016b), I contribute to the 
literature on technology adoption in developing countries, looking at what factors correlate 
with better management practices. Schools with greater autonomy and in geographical areas 
with a greater supply of skilled workers have better management practices, but other 
headteacher and school factors are not correlated with better practice.  
2 Empirical Approach 
2.1 Measuring School Management 
 
I measure school management quality using an adapted version of the Bloom et al (2015) and 
Lemos & Scur (2016) school management surveys2. Open-ended interviews are carried out, 
with responses scored against a descriptive rubric on a 1-5 scale for 20 question topics. These 
topics are grouped into four main areas; target-setting, monitoring, operations (planning and 
leading teaching), and people (teacher) management.  
 - Operations (planning and leading teaching): this covers the leadership of teaching in a 
school, the use of differentiated teaching for a range of students, how schools use data 
and assessment to guide practice, and how education best-practices are adapted;  - Monitoring: this includes how the school tracks and monitors performance; whether 
there are systems and processes in place to identify and fix problems; and how 
stakeholders are involved in ongoing quality improvement (students, teachers, 
community);  - Target setting: this includes how school targets are linked to student outcomes; 
specific targets for departments and teachers, how appropriate the targets are;  
                                                
2 Full details of changes made to the instrument are included in Annex 2. The full Uganda survey instrument is 
included in Annex 3. 
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- People: how teachers are recruited, managed, supported and retained.  
 
Each of the 20 scores depends on a series of individual questions that help build up an overall 
description of the concept being measured. This approach combines a rich open-ended 
discussion of management practices allowing for probing and clarification where necessary, 
with a quantitative framework to allow for comparison between schools. Scoring inevitably 
still depends on a subjective judgment by individual interviewers, and so substantial time 
needs to be taken in training enumerators, discussing in detail the level descriptors, and 
calibrating scores across interviewers across a range of practice interviews.3 
 
2.2 Management and Student Performance 
 
In order to look at the relationship between school management and student performance, I 
estimate a student learning production function following Todd and Wolpin (2003), in which 
student achievement ! is conceived of as a function of their ability ", and all present and past 
family inputs #, and school inputs $. 
 ! = 	'(" + # + $)         (1)
  
Management quality enters this framework as one of the school “inputs” as a form of 
intangible capital that affects the productivity of labour and capital, can be invested in, and 
can depreciate. Equation (1) can then be re-written such that the partial derivative of test 
scores with respect to school characteristics is a function of management capital +, non-
management labour ,, capital -, and an efficiency term ..  
 /!//$ = 	'(., ,, -,+)         (2)
   
In practice, estimation of (1) is impeded by the lack of measures of student ability and the full 
history of family and school inputs. A common solution is the estimation of a lagged 
dependent variable, dynamic OLS ‘value-added’ specification, in which a student’s prior test 
                                                
3 Interviews were double-scored in training, with a correlation of above 0.9 between scores from different 
enumerators. 
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score serves as a composite proxy variable for both their unobserved ability and all observed 
and unobserved prior home and school inputs, which allows for the estimation of the 
marginal effects of contemporaneous inputs. 
 
Here then test score !  of student 2  at school 3  at time 4  is related to their own lagged 
performance, student characteristics 56 , school characteristics $7 , and school management 
quality +7. Some of these school characteristics (specifically average socioeconomic status 
of students and school fees) proxy both for family inputs and school inputs. I assume that 
management quality is persistent and unchanging across the three years for which there is test 
score data. 
 
 !678 = 	. +	9:	!678;: + 9<	+7 + 9=	56 + 9>	$7 + ?678    (3) 
  
In principal these estimates may be biased due to non-random sorting of students to schools 
and unobserved student heterogeneity that may be correlated with both dependent and 
independent variables. In this data as I only have measurements from two time points I am 
unable to both estimate models that include both student fixed effects and a dynamic 
component controlling directly for prior performance. In practice however the size of this 
bias has been demonstrated to be small. Using simulated data Guarino et al. (2015) 
demonstrate that ‘naïve’ dynamic OLS models are more robust than other more complex non-
experimental estimators in recovering relatively accurate teacher effects. Using real data 
various studies have shown that simple value-added models can recover good approximations 
to experimentally identified parameters. Several studies compare lottery estimates of school 
effects with observational value-added estimates using the same data, finding very similar 
results (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2011, Angrist et al. 2013, Deming 2014). Focused on teachers, 
several studies find that observational value-added estimates of teacher effects in one year of 
a study are unbiased predictors of experimentally obtained value-added estimates of teacher 
effects from a different year (in which students were assigned to teacher classrooms 
randomly in the second year) (Kane and Staiger 2008, Kane et al. 2013). Similar results are 
found with quasi-experimental estimates based on teachers switching schools (Chetty et al. 
2014). Finally observational value-added estimates of the effect of private schools in Andhra 
Pradesh, India (Singh 2015),  very similar to experimental estimates from the same context 
and point in time (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2015). 
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An important concern in the Ugandan context is whether there are differential rates of 
dropouts between better and worse managed schools. It may be that better managed schools 
are successful primarily at encouraging under-performing students to leave. I argue that this 
is unlikely – schools are typically funded on a per-pupil basis either directly through fees or 
through per-student government subsidy, giving them a strong incentive not to cut enrolment. 
Further, parents and the media judge schools primarily on the absolute number of top grades 
(Division 1) achieved, and so schools are not penalized if they have a high number of low 
scoring candidates. I can also test this concern directly with the data on dropouts.  
 
2.3 Does Management Explain the effect of Private Schools? 
 
 
In order to explore the role that management plays in explaining the effect of different school 
types (public/private/public-private partnership), I follow the approach of Imai et al. (2010) 
within the framework of a Linear Structural Equation Model. Concretely, I test whether the 
effect of school type on learning is mediated by management quality. The direct effect of 
school type on learning is captured in 9> in equation (3), in which I control for the effect of 
management. The indirect or ‘mediation’ effect of school type on learning is captured by the 
product of the coefficient of management on learning 9< in equation (3), and the coefficient 
of school type on management quality, @: in equation (4) below.  
 
 +7 = 	.< + @:	$7 + A678                                                        (4) 
 
The total effect is then the sum of the direct effect and the indirect effect. Identification of the 
mediation effect relies upon the assumption that the correlation between the residuals of the 
two equations is zero. I then estimate a ‘sensitivity parameter’ B as the size of correlation that 
would be necessary for the true effect to be zero. 
 
 B = 	CDEE(?678, A678)           (5) 
 
2.4 What Explains Management? 
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Finally, going beyond school type I look for other factors that might explain variation in 
management quality.  Starting with the accountability framework laid out in the 2004 World 
Development Report, we can think of two possible routes of accountability for public service 
providers that might lead to improved school management – a) the long route of 
accountability from citizens through the state then down to service providers, or b) the short 
direct route through consumer or user pressure on providers.  
 
With regards to top-down accountability we observe little variation across schools - students 
from all schools take the same common entrance and exit examinations. Government schools 
are subject to a very weak, process-focused inspections regime. One part of this relationship 
where we do observe variation is the degree of autonomy that schools are provided with, a 
common focus of studies on school performance. Here I do have measures of school 
autonomy and can test the correlation between this measure and school management. 
 
With bottom-up accountability, the responsiveness of school management (and value-added 
performance) to parent/customer demand depends on how we view the school choice 
decision. If parents are seriously interested in quality and value-added, then we might think 
of competition as driving up standards. In this case the model outlined in Bloom et al (2015), 
in which management is a technology that affects the productivity of inputs (capital and 
labour), provides several intuitive predictions. Management increases performance, but also 
there is likely to be (i) a positive effect of competition on management, (ii) a positive effect 
of firm age on management, as the result of a survival/selection process in which poorly 
managed firms are more likely to go out of business and close (and therefore not reach old 
age), and (iii) that management is increasing in the local supply of skills (as the cost of hiring 
good teachers is reduced). An alternative theory is one in which parents care primarily about 
school reputation. When schools are also able to select their pupils (as they are in this 
context), competition can lead to segregation by ability, and no actual increase in school 
performance measured as value-added (MacLeod and Urquiola, 2015). 
 
I test these predictions in the specification below, in which management M is estimated as a 
function of school characteristics S, headteacher characteristics HT, and community 
characteristics C (including the number of nearby schools per capita, the distance to a 
National Teacher Training College, and the quality of schooling in the subcounty 13 years 
ago).  
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                +7 = 	. +	9:	$7 +	9<	F!G + 9=	HI +	?678    (6) 
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3 The School System in Uganda 
 
Uganda introduced free universal primary schooling in 1997, and free secondary schooling in 
2007. Enrolment rates have risen accordingly - the net enrolment rate at primary level is now 
above 90%, but the primary completion rate is only around 54%, and the secondary rates are 
lower; around 23% net enrolment and 29% junior secondary completion (2013, World Bank 
WDI). The official age of school entry is 6 years old (median age currently in the first grade 
is 7 years old in 2012 survey data4), and there are 7 grades of primary school (P1-P7), 
followed by 4 years of lower secondary (S1-S4) and 2 years of senior secondary (S5-S6).  
 
The Uganda National Examinations Board (UNEB) administers exams at the end of the last 
year of primary school (grade 7) to pupils in both public and private schools (the Primary 
Leaving Exam (PLE)). It is a requirement to pass this exam in order to progress to secondary 
school. Of 627,000 students enrolled in the last grade of primary (P7) in 2014, 586,000 (93%) 
registered and sat the PLE, and 517,000 (82%) passed. Students take exams in 4 subjects; 
English, Maths, Science, and Social Studies. Within each subject a score is given between 1 
and 9, in which a score of 1-2 is a Distinction, 3-6 is a Credit, 7-8 is a Pass, and 9 a Fail. 
UNEB reported 909 cases of exam malpractice in 2015 (cheating by collusion, external 
assistance or impersonation), down from 1,344 cases in 2014.  
 
At secondary school, Ordinary level exams (Uganda Certificate of Education (UCE)) are 
taken after 4 years in a minimum of eight subjects, and Advanced level exams taken after 2 
further years in three subjects. The Uganda Certificate of Education (UCE) comprises six 
mandatory subjects administered in English; these are Mathematics, English language, 
Biology, Chemistry, Physics, and a choice of either Geography, or History, or Religious 
education. The two final optional subjects can include cultural subjects (such as Music); 
technical subjects (such as Carpentry); or other subjects such as Accounting, Business and 
Computer science. As for PLE scores, UCE scores are given for each subject between 1 and 
9, where a 1-2 is a Distinction and a 9 is a Fail.  
 
 
                                                
4 2011-12 Third wave of the Uganda National Panel Survey 
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There are 1,007 government secondary schools and 1,785 private secondary schools, of 
which some from both sector are part of the free Universal Secondary Education programme 
(USE). Government schools have on average nearly twice as many students as private 
schools. Table 1 shows summary statistics.  
 
Teacher recruitment is managed centrally for public schools. Schools submit vacancies to the 
Ministry of Education, who then allocate teachers to schools. Teachers are paid directly into 
their bank account by the Ministry of Public Service, making it difficult for schools to vary 
pay according to performance. In the private sector teachers are paid substantially lower 
wages and schools follow their own recruitment procedures (Ugandan Ministry of Education 
and Sport and UNESCO - IIEP Pôle de Dakar, 2014). Government teacher starting salaries 
according to the Public Service Payscale are 511,000 Ugandan Shillings (UGX) ($150) per 
month. Data is not available for private sector teachers, but across all occupations, median 
monthly wages were 330,000 UGX ($100) in the public sector and 99,000 UGX ($30) in the 
private sector for those in paid employment aged 14-64 in the 2012/13 National Household 
Survey (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014). 
 
Free Universal Secondary Education (USE) Programme 
 
The Universal Secondary Education (USE) programme offers free places at registered 
schools for eligible pupils. Most government schools are registered for USE, with the 
exception of a minority of elite schools that opt out. Due to the limited number of 
government secondary schools when the programme was introduced, private schools were 
also made eligible to register as part of a public-private partnership (PPP) in sub-counties 
either in which there were no participating public secondary schools, where those 
government schools were over-crowded, or where pupils must travel very long distances to 
reach the closest government school. This policy is borne out in the 2013 EMIS data – 91% 
of sub-counties with no free USE government school have a PPP school, compared to only 
52% of sub-counties that do have a free USE government school. To qualify, schools must be 
registered, certified, charge low fees (defined as 75,000 UGX ($22) or less), and meet a set of 
criteria including having adequate infrastructure, a board of governors, and sufficient 
qualified teaching staff. Partnering private schools also become eligible to receive other 
support from the government including the provision of textbooks and other teaching 
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materials. 
 
For students to be eligible, they must have a score of 28 or better in their PLE exam, 
corresponding to an average passing grade in each of the four tested subjects. In our sample, 
6% of students at government USE schools and 8% of students at private USE (PPP) schools 
had actually failed to meet this threshold. The majority of students enrolled are funded 
through USE.  
 
Government schools are entitled to 41,000 UGX ($12) per term per student (in addition to 
other transfers to schools including teacher salaries), and PPP schools to 47,000 UGX ($14) 
per term per student, on condition that they do not charge any other non-boarding fees. In 
practice, despite transfers from government and fees being prohibited for USE students, 
parents still report substantial fees paid to both government and PPP schools. Median 
reported annual household spending on school fees per child at secondary school was 
360,000 UGX ($107) for PPP schools and 150,000 UGX ($44) at government schools (this 
includes registration fees and contributions to school development funds). Similar amounts 
are spent on books and uniforms in government and private schools. 
 
Participating schools have control over the student selection process; they may enroll as 
many students as they want, and can continue to enroll non-USE students (private students) 
for whom fees may be charged. Many schools, both government and private, operate more 
demanding PLE entrance criteria than the official minimum score of 28. 
 
Roll-out of the USE programme amongst private schools was randomized, allowing for a 
high-quality estimate of the impact on private schools of accessing this public funding. 
Private schools that obtained public USE funding experienced greater enrolment growth, 
improved student performance (on low-stakes tests), but also more selection of better 
performing students at entrance. Despite the official eligibility requirements, there was no 
effect of USE registration on school governance arrangements (Barrera-Osorio et al 2015).   
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4 Data 
 
I compile data from our own 2016 management survey, with school characteristics taken 
from the 2015 Ark School Survey, official test score data for 2015 from the Uganda 
Examinations Board (UNEB), and further contextual data on schools from the 2013 
Education Management Information System (EMIS), and the national population census in 
2014 and 2002. Table 2 shows a summary of test scores and management scores by school 
type, and Table 3 presents full summary statistics across all data sources.   
 
Management Survey 
 
The management survey was carried out with a stratified random sample of 200 schools from 
the 2015 Ark School Survey, plus the 19 international public-private partnership schools. The 
sample includes 82 regular government schools, 7 elite government schools (not part of the 
free secondary education programme, high fee-charging, high socioeconomic status 
students), 62 public-private partnership (PPP) schools, and 48 fully private schools. 
The survey was carried out in January 2016 by telephone from a call centre in Kampala, from 
a nationally representative sample of 305 schools (stratified by ownership and district), from 
which an overall response rate of 65% was obtained (199 schools). A list of school leader 
phone numbers were provided by the Ministry of Education. 29% of these numbers failed to 
connect or were not answered. Only 6% refused to participate in the survey. This response 
rate is substantially higher than that found in other countries, from a high of 58% in Brazil to 
just 8% in the UK). A linear probability model (LPM), probit, and logit model all show that 
none of the main school characteristics5 from the first round survey are correlated with the 
probability of response for the second round management survey (Table A2). 
Interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Around 10% of interviews were double-scored 
by a research manager, with an average variation in double-marked overall scores of 0.1 - 0.2 
points. Surveys benefit from being “double-blinded” in the sense that interviewers are not 
influenced by their physical impressions of the school or knowledge of school performance, 
                                                
5 The characteristics tested are the number of students, average socioeconomic status of students, years of 
operation, location, average fees, head teacher experience and qualifications, teacher qualifications, and school 
type. 
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and respondents were not aware of the rubric against which they were being graded. 
Telephone surveys have been demonstrated in other contexts to generate data that is 
statistically indistinguishable from in-person interviewing (Garlick et al. 2016, Bloom et al. 
2012a). 
 
We also asked a set of standard questions on school autonomy taken from the OECD PISA 
survey. Headteachers are asked who has the main responsibility for deciding on budget 
allocations, selecting teachers for hire, setting teacher salaries, deciding who to admit, which 
courses to offer, the content of courses, and which textbooks to use. Where the head teacher, 
school owner, or governing board are primarily responsible, this is coded as the school 
having autonomy over that area, whereas where the Ministry of Education is primarily 
responsible the school is coded as not autonomous. In line with our expectations, private 
schools and PPP schools have a similar level of autonomy, which is greater than the 
autonomy of regular government schools.  On budget autonomy, almost all private schools 
and the majority of government schools claim to have school level autonomy. On salaries and 
hiring, almost all private schools report having autonomy, compared with 70% of 
government schools. Private schools are also more likely to report autonomy on admissions, 
course choice, and textbook choice. On course content only around a quarter of schools, 
whether public or private report having autonomy, with content most commonly being 
determined by the Ministry of Education. 
 
Ark School Survey 
 
The Ark School Survey was carried out in 2015 with a nationally representative sample 
stratified across Uganda’s 4 regions and across school type (public and private). 10 districts 
were sampled from each of the Central, Western, and Eastern regions, and 6 from the less 
populated Northern region. For each district 10 schools were randomly sampled, of which 4 
were government schools and 6 private schools.  
 
Public schools are on average larger than private schools, though PPP schools are closer in 
size to public schools as they receive a government subsidy per pupil place. Schools of all 
types report charging tuition (and other) fees, despite this not being officially permitted for 
government schools and PPP schools. Of the fully private schools, around half are non-profit. 
95% of schools use academic selection criteria. The majority of schools (55%) are religious. 
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The majority of government schools are in rural areas, with private schools and PPP schools 
more prevalent in urban and peri-urban areas. 
 
Average socioeconomic status of students is estimated with a household asset survey 
administered to students in the fourth grade of secondary school (S4) following Filmer and 
Pritchett (2001). This data is not linked to individual test score results as those students had 
already left the school, but instead gives an estimate of school-average socioeconomic status. 
Students are private schools are 0.15 standard deviations higher than average socioeconomic 
status. 
 
Headteachers and teachers have fewer years of experience in private schools than in 
government schools, and are less likely to have higher qualifications, in line with private 
schools in general paying lower salaries and having lower job security than in the public 
sector.  
 
Test Score Data 
 
Students take national standardized tests at the end of primary (PLE) and then again at the 
end of junior secondary school (UCE). Prior to 2015 this data was not digitized and centrally 
stored. In 2015 the Ark School Survey visited schools and collected UCE scores directly 
from school paper records for a sample of schools in 2014 and 2013. In addition, the linked 
PLE score (from 2009 or 2010) for each student was obtained from school records. From 
2015, the Uganda National Examinations Board (UNEB) provided a full national set of 
individual student UCE results, linked to their individual PLE result. This gives a total 
sample of 43,156 students across 3 years from 218 schools. 
 
Students sit UCE exams in 8 (or more) subjects. Their final classification is based on an 
average points score across their 8 best subjects. Points are awarded based on the percentage 
mark in exams, with 1 point as the best possible score corresponding a mark of 80-100% on 
the exam, and 9 points being the worst possible score, corresponding to a mark of 0-39%. 
Our main outcome variable is the aggregate point score across 8 subjects (inverted so that 
positive coefficients mean a better result, and standardized so that the mean is zero and the 
standard deviation is one, to allow for easier interpretation of estimated coefficients). 
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PLE scores are scored in a similar manner from 1 to 9 points for each of the four individual 
subjects (English, Maths, Science, and Social Studies). For the prior test score variable, 
again, I take the aggregate points score across these four subjects, invert it and standardize it.  
 
School Markets 
 
In order to understand the factors that affect management quality, I assemble a series of 
additional contextual variables about the markets that schools operate in. First, I measure 
competition as the total number of schools (taken from the 2013 Education Management 
Information System (EMIS)) per capita (from the 2014 census) within a sub-county. There 
are 2,792 secondary schools nationally and 1,382 sub-counties, giving an average of 2 
schools per subcounty. In our sample the median school is in a subcounty that has 3 schools 
in total.  Second, school age in years is taken from our school survey. All government junior 
secondary school teachers must have at least a qualification from one of these colleges or a 
university. Third, I use two measures of the local supply of skills, the distance from each 
school to a National Teacher College (NTC) is calculated based on the shortest distance 
between their GPS coordinates, and the local child literacy and enrolment rates are calculated 
from self-reports of literacy from the 2002 census for all children aged 5 to 18 years.   
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5 Results 
 
5.1 Management Scores 
 
On average schools in our nationally representative sample of Ugandan secondary schools 
score 2.0 points on the 1 to 5 scale, placing them above India and very slightly below Brazil, 
a result that seems plausible, despite some adaptations to our survey instrument. Schools tend 
to perform worse than manufacturing and retail firms in other contexts - the highest 
performing average school management score is the UK at 2.9 (Bloom et al 2015). The 
distribution of schools in Uganda is roughly symmetrical, with very few schools in Uganda 
scoring above a 3, which is similar to the distribution in India, but notably different to that in 
Brazil where despite low average management scores, there is an upper tail of high 
performance. 
 
Management scores do not vary systematically for government, private, and PPP schools for 
either the aggregate score or any of the sub-components. Elite government schools (those not 
in the USE scheme) do score 0.4 points higher, and more dramatically a chain of 
internationally-owned PPP schools score 1 point (2 standard deviations) higher. 6  The 
difference in overall management quality between elite government schools and others is 
present in their operations management (teaching quality control), target setting, and 
monitoring, but they are not better than average on teacher management. There is also 
substantial variation in management quality within school types. This variation is greatest for 
the international PPP schools, which is possibly explained by them being substantially newer 
than other schools (average of 3 years old). Table 4 presents average management scores for 
other school characteristics.  
 
I had expected to find that private schools would score more highly than government schools 
at least on people or teacher management, due to the explanation for greater efficiency in the 
private sector in similar contexts so frequently being due to greater accountability for 
teachers. Looking at individual items with the overall people/teacher management score, 
                                                
6 This finding is supported by a separate study into the same school chain (EPRC 2016) that found substantially 
greater evidence of schools having a vision and providing performance reviews and feedback to teachers, in the 
international PPP schools than in domestic PPP schools (Table 13).  
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private schools do in fact score better than public schools on hiring and recruitment, but no 
better in the other items (attracting talent, rewarding and promoting high performers, and 
dealing with poor performers). 
 
5.2 Management and Student Performance 
 
There is a clear positive correlation between school management and student performance. 
On average, a school with a 1 standard deviation higher management score is associated with 
a 0.05 standard deviation higher average UCE test score, after controlling for prior test 
scores, sex, and school characteristics (location, average student socioeconomic status, school 
size, and fees) (Table 5). 
 
Estimates for other countries (Bloom et al 2015) are based on school-average test scores 
rather than individual student test scores, so we need to make an adjustment to allow for a 
direct comparison with our student-level estimates. Collapsing individual student test scores 
to school-averages reduces the standard deviation across units by around half. When scores 
are then standardized (to z-scores), ‘effects’ on school-average scores are therefore roughly 
twice as large as ‘effects’ on individual student scores. In order to adjust for this to allow a 
comparison between my estimates on student data with earlier results on school data, I make 
an adjustment based on the within-school standard deviation of test scores. 
 
For countries in the Bloom et al (2015) sample, I make use of 2012 PISA data, first 
standardizing student test scores, then collapsing the data to school-averages, and then 
calculating the standard deviation in school-average test scores. These vary slightly across 
countries but remain close to 0.5 in both the PISA data and in our Uganda data. Table 6 
presents the original and adjusted estimates of the effect of management on student 
performance from the 6 countries studied in Bloom et al (2015) alongside our estimate for 
Uganda.  
 
Breaking down the management index by the four main components (Table 7) suggests that 
operations, target-setting, and people management (but not monitoring) are independently 
correlated with student performance. These results are similar to those in the international 
study, where people management has the largest relationship with performance followed by 
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target-setting, monitoring, and operations, though there is no a priori reason why the sub-
components of management should have equal weight in systems with different binding 
constraints to improved performance. I also test the effect of a collection of 5 management 
sub-indicators highlighted by Dobbie and Fryer (2013) as components of success. This 
‘Dobbie-Fryer index’ of sub-indicators is significantly correlated with performance after 
controlling for school characteristics, but with a smaller magnitude than our overall measure 
of management.  
 
I test for a range of interactions of management quality with student and school 
characteristics, finding little evidence for heterogeneous effects. One hypothesis is that better 
managed schools might put more attention on high potential students, as Ugandan media 
focus discussion of schools on the proportion of candidates achieving the top (‘Division 1’) 
grade. However there is no difference in the overall effect of management by prior test score 
or by student gender. A refinement of this hypothesis is that any focus on high potential 
students might be expressed only through the ‘target-setting’ sub-component of management. 
Anecdotally from the qualitative survey answers, some schools do have explicit targets for 
the number of top ‘Division 1’ scores obtained. Here I do find a positive and significant 
interaction between the effect of target-setting and prior test score on performance. This 
pattern is visible in a step-wise regression with individual dummy variables for each prior test 
score point, the coefficients of which are plotted in Figure 6.  
 
Looking at school characteristics interactions of management with ownership, location, size, 
average socioeconomic status, and level of fees are all statistically insignificant. The one 
statistically significant interaction is with the drop-out rate between S3 and the final S4 exam, 
implicitly a selection effect rather than a treatment effect, that is greater in better managed 
schools. One explanation for this could be that better managed schools might encourage 
students not to take the final exam if they are not expected to do well. The effect of 
management remains of similar magnitude when excluding specific types of schools (such as 
elite government and international NGO schools).  
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Robustness 
 
An obvious concern is that better managed schools may be perform better for other reasons 
besides management. Here I include controls for student prior test score, student 
socioeconomic status, and school fees, all of which reduce but do not eliminate the 
coefficient on management, suggesting that is some selection bias in the effects of 
management on test scores before controlling for student intake. The value-added 
specification assumes that prior test scores account for unobserved student ability, as well as 
all past inputs, both home and school. However as these prior test scores come four years 
before the final test score, we ideally need separate measures of home inputs between the two 
tests in order to estimate the marginal effect of schools. The best I can do here is assume that 
student socioeconomic status and average school fees paid can serve as a proxy for family 
inputs. I don’t have any measurements at the classroom or teacher-level, though the 
hypothesized effect of management on performance should work through improved teaching 
at the classroom level through better support and accountability for classroom teachers.  
 
Selection on unobservables 
 
In Table 8 below I implement the Altonji et al. (2005)  / (Oster, 2016) bounding exercise, 
which estimates the amount of selection J on unobservables that would be necessary for the 
estimated coefficient of management 9	on student test scores to be zero. The selection 
parameter J  is expressed relative to (as a percentage of) the degree of selection on 
observables. A selection parameter J of 1 is suggested as a heuristic cut-off point – so we 
assume that selection on unobservables is likely to be not greater than selection on 
observables, given that covariates are typically selected purposively in order to account for as 
much of the variation in the dependent variable as possible. In our case this assumption 
seems reasonable, as a student’s lagged test score alone accounts for more than 50% of the 
variation in test scores.  The bottom two rows indicate that if we thought that achieving an K< 
of 1 was realistic, then selection on unobservables would only have to be 57% of the amount 
of selection on observables for a	9of zero to be possible. However assuming that an K< of 1 
is realistic given immutable noise is a demanding hurdle - Oster (2016) finds that only 10% 
of results published in top 4 journals over the previous 5 years pass this hurdle. A more 
achievable benchmark for KLMN  is 1.3  x the R-squared achieved in the most complete 
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specification K. In this case, our result ‘passes’ this test, in that selection on unobservables 
would have to be greater (1.46x) than selection on observables for the coefficient on 
management to actually be 0.  
 
Dropouts 
 
Dropouts between the start of secondary and the final examination are an important concern. 
The value-added specification will produce consistent estimates only if dropouts are caused 
only by time-invariant student characteristics. The overall decrease in the size of the cohort 
that started S1 in 2011 and entered S4 in 2014 is 16% (Table 11). First, I argue that dropouts 
are most likely due to student-specific demand-side factors rather than being related to school 
quality. Of people who completed one of the first three grades of secondary school but did 
not take the UCE exam, 69% reported that they left school due to trouble paying fees. Just 
1% reported leaving due to poor academic progress (Uganda National Panel Survey wave 3, 
2012). 
 
Common approaches to dealing with bias caused by attrition include Heckman selection 
models and inverse probability weighting of observations, which can produce unbiased 
estimates if ‘selection’ or attrition is caused by observable individual characteristics.  As our 
student-level sample only includes those who have taken the UCE exam, I do not have data 
on students that did drop out, so I can’t estimate the probability of attrition within the sample. 
As an approximation however, I can look at the national distribution of primary school 
leaving exam (PLE) scores by gender, and estimate the probability of individual dropout 
based on the relative proportions of each score by sex for the pre-secondary entry PLE results 
and the PLE results of those taking the secondary certificate in our sample. As I do not have a 
credible instrument (a variable that causes selection but not the outcome) I do not estimate 
the Heckman selection model, but instead apply inverse probability weighting. Relying on 
the full distribution of PLE scores rather than the distribution of PLE scores for students that 
have already started secondary school relies upon the assumption that this distribution is not 
substantially different. I argue that this is a reasonable assumption, as the PLE is optional and 
costly, and is typically taken only by students who do intend to progress to secondary school, 
for which it is a requirement. Weighting observations by their inverse probability does not 
substantially affect the coefficient on management.  
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A final check is looking at the correlation between the reported number of dropouts between 
S3 and the final S4 exam at the school-level, for which I do have data, and the school 
management score. There is no systematic relationship between this school-level measure of 
dropouts and school management. In our sample, this rate of dropout between students in S3 
and those taking the UCE exam at the end of S4 is 21%, above the overall national rate of 
reported dropout from students enrolled in S1 in 2011 to those enrolled in S4 in 2014 was 
16%, down from a higher dropout rate in previous years.  
 
Test Score Measurement 
 
Another concern here is our measurement of the dependent variable (UCE test scores), and 
whether any flaws in official test results as proxies for student learning is correlated with any 
of our independent variables.  If a better managed school was only better at preparing 
students for exams without them actually learning any more, results for the effect of 
management on performance would be biased upwards. One check available for this is a 
question asked of Head Teachers about the amount of exam preparation carried out in 
schools. Controlling for exam preparation makes no difference to the coefficient of 
management on performance. Any ‘classical’ measurement error in prior test scores will lead 
just to attenuation of the effect of these prior test scores on secondary scores. 
 
I also test alternative scaling of the test score measure. Using an ordinal logit across test 
grades produces similar results to the linear approximation used in the main specifications.  
 
Management Index 
 
The main management index I use is a weighted average of the 20 sub-areas of management, 
first taking the average of sub-areas for each of the 4 main sub-components, and then taking 
the average of these 4 sub-components. The relationship between management and student 
performance is robust to aggregating the individual question areas of management in 
different ways, either by simple averaging across all 20, or by principal components analysis. 
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5.3 Does Management Explain the effect of Private Schools? 
 
Although school management varies substantially, there are few differences on average 
between major types of schools. Unlike in OECD countries where ‘autonomous government 
schools’ (here referred to as PPP schools) score highest on management, in the two 
developing countries for which there is data (previously India, and now here Uganda) there is 
little difference in management score between most public, private, or public-private 
partnership schools. In Uganda there are two exceptions; first a small number of selective 
elite government schools with high fees and wealthy students, that are on average 0.4 points 
better managed than other government schools, and second a chain of internationally-owned 
non-profit PPP schools, which score 1.1 points better than average.  
 
Elite government schools are substantially better resourced than average, which might 
explain their advantage (despite this holding after controlling for student SES and school 
fees). International PPP schools on the other hand have primarily the same level of resources 
as local PPP schools. One plausible explanation for this better performance is the notion of 
technology transfer from the international owners of the chain from the UK to Uganda (in 
line with findings that subsidiary manufacturing firms of multinational companies perform 
better than domestically owned firms (Bloom et al, 2014 and Bloom et al., 2012b)).   
 
This is likely supported by the existence of an effective within-network accountability 
system, based on a rigorous modern inspections regime that combines official examinations 
data (Hanushek and Raymond 2005, Hanushek et al. 2013) with subjective performance 
assessment (Hussain, 2015). Anecdotally, the supervision model for the international school 
chain includes detailed targets for a range of performance indicators, high-stakes 
accountability for head teachers with the removal of those under-performing and promotion 
of those successful, and ongoing support and challenge throughout the year. Unfortunately I 
don’t however have the necessary variation in this study to test this hypothesis.  
 
In Table 12 I estimate the correlation between school type and student value-added. Column 
(1) presents raw test scores (without lagged test score), before sequentially adding controls. 
The final column (4) includes management score. Here, as expected, none of the school type 
coefficients change, except the international PPP schools, which loses statistical significance.  
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Following the approach to causal mediation outlined by (Imai et al., 2010), I can subject this 
finding to a sensitivity analysis. Although this framework confirms the finding that the entire 
effect of international PPP schools is mediated by management, a sensitivity analysis shows 
that the effect is not robust to substantial correlation between the error terms from the test 
score and the management regression. The threshold value ρ at which the mediation effect 
would be zero is just 0.069. 
 
5.4 What Explains Management? 
 
 
First I test whether management varies with the degree of autonomy afforded to schools. The 
average (mean) autonomy score across these 6 categories is positively but insignificantly 
correlated with school management scores, with large standard errors (Table 14). It should 
also be noted that none of the autonomy measures are statistically significantly correlated 
with student performance. 
Focusing just on autonomy over hiring and firing decisions (a common subject of studies 
looking at the role of the private sector), the average of these two components is also 
insignificantly correlated with overall school management, but is correlated with the ‘people 
management’ component of the overall management score. Schools with autonomy over 
staffing do score higher. The R-squared of staffing autonomy as an explanatory factor for 
people management quality is 0.15, suggesting that our people management score captures 
greater variation than the simple binary indicator of autonomy (Table 12).  
Second, looking at the competition variables, I find that only school age is robustly correlated 
with management (after controlling for other school characteristics).  
We are left with a puzzle – that despite better management practices improving school 
performance at little extra cost, most schools do not adopt them. Some clues are provided by 
the literature on technology adoption in developing countries, which identifies a number of 
possible constraints to adoption (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010, Jack 2011). The informational 
constraint seems particularly important in this context – it may simply be that most school 
leaders are not aware of what good modern management practices are, and how they can be 
applied in schools. One piece of evidence for this hypothesis is the very low correlation 
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(0.145) between head teachers’ self-assessment of the quality of management in their school 
with our measure. Neither do these self-assessments of school management do not correlate 
with student performance. Another possibly important constraint is on the supply-side – 
where there is little widespread provision by either market or state of management training in 
this context for school leaders.  
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 6. Conclusion 
 
This paper adds to a growing literature on the importance of management for school 
performance. I present the first internationally comparable measure of school management 
quality from sub-Saharan Africa, placing the management quality of Ugandan schools in 
international context. Management matters for school performance, measured by growth in 
individual student test scores (or “value-added”). Further, though there is some level of 
higher spending which can lead to better management (as demonstrated by the better 
performance of elite government schools), amongst non-elite schools there is little correlation 
between school fees or other school resources and management performance, showing that in 
principle better management can be a low-cost strategy for improving learning outcomes. 
School management is not significantly better in private or autonomous schools.  
 
I find few variables that matter for explaining variation in school management. School 
autonomy may provide the opportunity for better management, but it is not sufficient by 
itself. An international PPP chain does manage to achieve substantially better management 
quality and correspondingly improved student test scores, which I argue is due to a better top-
down accountability and performance management system, though I do not have the variation 
in the data to test this hypothesis. Future research could usefully address this question of how 
to improve school management at scale, and the role that performance management systems 
and school inspections can play. 
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Figure 1: Map of School Locations 
 
Figure 2: Average Management Score by Country and School Type 
 
Notes: Scores from Uganda are from my survey, scores for other countries from Bloom et al (2015) 
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Figure 3: Distribution of School Management Scores within Countries  
 
Notes: Scores for US, India, and Brazil are taken from Bloom et al (2015) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of School Management Scores by School Type 
 
Notes: The distribution of management quality is presented here by school type. The distributions for public, 
private, and PPP schools all overlap, only elite government (omitted) and international PPP schools (IPPP) 
performing substantially better. Scores for UK schools are overlayed from Bloom et al.  
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Figure 5: Management and School Value-added 
 
Notes: School VA is calculated as the simple school mean of residuals from a student growth regression, 
including controls for student prior test score, sex, and year. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Heterogeneous effects of management & target-setting by prior test score 
 
Notes: Effect sizes estimated for each possible prior test score (PLE) with a piecewise regression, entering the 
interaction of each individual PLE score as a dummy variable multiplied by the school management score. 
Regressions control for school characteristics, with standard errors clustered    
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Figure 7: Management Score and School Autonomy 
  
Notes: Bivariate correlations between measures of autonomy and management show a weakly positive 
correlation for overall management (on the left) and a stronger correlation for staff/people autonomy and 
staff/people management (on the right).  
 
 
1
2
3
4
M
an
ag
em
en
t S
co
re
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
School Autonomy
1
2
3
4
Pe
op
le 
M
an
ag
em
en
t S
co
re
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Staff Autonomy
 8 
Table 1: School Characteristics (all schools) 
School Type 
Number of 
Schools 
Average School 
Size (Pupils) 
Total 
Pupils 
% Pupils 
Female 
Household 
Spending on Fees 
Government 886 583 516,156 0.46 93,000 
Elite Government 121 820 99,177 0.55 270,000 
PPP 664 479 317,975 0.48 172,500 
Private 1,114 284 316,162 0.52 360,000 
International PPP 28 362 10,136 0.45 - 
      
Total 2,813 448 1,259,606 0.48 223,875 
Notes: Data on household spending on fees is taken from the Uganda National Panel Survey Wave 3 2011/12. 
Data for the international PPP schools are provided by the NGO ‘Peas’. All other data is from the 2013 EMIS. 
 
 
 
Table 2: School Characteristics (Survey Sample Summary) 
School Type Final Exam VA Management 
Government  -0.12 -0.07 2.0 
Elite Government  1.03 0.32 2.4 
PPP  -0.16 -0.01 2.0 
Private   0.25 0.12 1.9 
International PPP  0.09 0.1 3.0 
    Total 0 0 2.1 
Notes: Both final exam scores and value-added scores are first standardized at the individual student level by 
year, before taking means across all students in each school type. 
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Table 3: School Characteristics (Survey Sample Detail) 
 Gov Elite Gov PPP Private IPPP All N 
        
Number of Schools 82 7 62 48 24 223 223 
Management        
Aggregate Score 2.0 2.4 2.0 1.9 3.0 2.1 223 
- Operations 2.0 2.4 1.9 2.0 3.3 2.1 223 
- Monitoring 2.1 2.4 2.0 1.9 3.0 2.1 223 
- Target-Setting 1.7 2.4 1.8 1.6 2.7 1.8 223 
- People 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 3.1 2.2 223 
Test Scores & Students        
     Value-Added (z-score) -0.07 0.32 -0.01 0.12 0.10 0.00  
     UCE (z-score) -0.12 1.03 -0.16 0.25 0.09 0.00  
     Total Students 11,741 1,583 6,118 3,353 1,085 23,880  
     Mean Students (2015) 563 552 427 281 510 458 223 
     SES Index (z-score) -0.39 1.46 -0.07 0.26 -0.37 -0.09 210 
     Dropout Rate (S3-UCE, %) 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.34 0.21 205 
School Characteristics        
    Total Fees* (UGX) 72 109 79 114 107 88 223 
     % Religious 0.66 0.86 0.60 0.46 0.00 0.53 223 
     % Rural 0.83 0.57 0.55 0.48 1.00 0.69 223 
     Km to Kampala 211 180 193 167 192 193 223 
     % Heads with postgrad 0.39 1.00 0.18 0.13 . 0.25 223 
     Head Experience (Years) 10 19 9 7 . 9 197 
     Teacher Experience (Years) 7 10 6 6 . 7 199 
Autonomy        
     Admissions 0.71 0.86 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.86 211 
     Staff 0.69 0.50 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.86 223 
     Academic 0.45 0.53 0.57 0.63 0.64 0.54 208 
     All (Mean) 0.62 0.67 0.81 0.85 0.86 0.75 223 
School Market        
     Schools per capita** 1.4 2.4 1.7 1.9 0.8 1.6 214 
     School Age (years) 27 44 16 11 3 18 216 
     Distance to NTC (mean Km) 98 112 84 88 94 92 223 
     2002 Child Literacy Rate** 0.45 0.53 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 199 
Notes: Management scores and school autonomy scores are from our WMS-style management survey. Test 
scores are from UNEB for 2015 and the Ark School Survey for 2014 and 2013. School characteristics are from 
the Ark School Survey. School Market variables are from the EMIS, census, and Ark School Survey. * Total 
fees comprise tuition fees plus fees for extra classes, uniforms, lunch, & ‘other’.  ** These school market 
variables are presented at the sub-county level 
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Table 4: Management quality by school characteristic 
  
Schools 
Management 
(Mean) 
Management 
(SD) 
School type    
 Government (USE) 82 2.0 0.32 
 Elite Government (Not USE) 7 2.4 0.24 
 PPP (Private USE) 62 2.0 0.34 
 Private (Not USE) 48 1.9 0.32 
 International PPP (USE) 19 3.1 0.59 
School location    
           Kampala 4 2.24 0.31 
           Other Urban 22 2.10 0.34 
           Rural 173 1.95 0.33 
Religious Orientation    
 Not religious 95 2.2 0.62 
 Anglican/Protestant 61 1.9 0.32 
 Catholic 47 2.0 0.35 
 Other 11 1.9 0.34 
Selective Entrance    
 No Selection 11 2.0 0.66 
 Academic Selection 204 2.1 0.48 
Profit    
 Not for Profit 163 2.1 0.52 
 For Profit 50 2.0 0.35 
Headteacher qualifications    
 Postgraduate 56 2.0 0.37 
 Graduate/ Bachelor’s degree 142 2.0 0.32 
Headteacher's employment    
 No other job 187 2.1 0.51 
 HT has 2nd job 28 1.8 0.22 
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Table 5: Regression of Student Test Scores on School Management    
 (1) (2) (3) (4)    
     
Management (Z-Score) 0.244*** 0.083*** 0.046** 0.050**  
 (0.074) (0.027) (0.020) (0.025)    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Prior Test Score  Yes Yes Yes    
Location Controls   Yes Yes    
School Controls   Yes Yes    
School Type    Yes    
     
N (Students) 41,818 41,818 41,818 41,818    
N (Schools) 210 210 210 210    
N (Years) 3 3 3 3    
R-squared 0.031 0.528 0.562 0.571    
Notes: Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. School controls include size (number of students), fees, & 
student socioeconomic status. Location controls include sub-region fixed effects, dummy variables for 
Kampala/Urban/Rural, and a linear distance from Kampala measured in Km.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
      
 
 
Table 6: International Regressions of Student Test Scores on Management 
 All  
(excl Ug) 
Bra Can Ind Swe US UK Ug 
 Score Score Score Score Score Score VA VA 
Mgmt (z-score) 0.23*** 0.10** 0.61 0.50** 0.24 0.17** 0.88** 
 
(0.044) (0.050) (0.368) (0.243) (0.206) (0.080) (0.369) 
 
School SD 0.49 0.59 0.47 0.49 0.54 0.51 0.50 0.46 
Adj Effect Size 0.12*** 0.06** 0.28 0.24** 0.13 0.08** 0.45** 0.05** 
School controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pupil controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1002 472 77 152 82 133 78 210 
Notes: Bloom et al (2015) estimate effects of management on school average performance (standardized to 
mean 0, standard deviation 1). In order to render these estimates comparable with our estimates on individual 
student performance, we make an adjustment for the standard deviation of school-average test scores (calculated 
from 2012 PISA for non-Uganda countries). The adjusted effect size is therefore an estimate from these studies 
for the effect of management on individual student performance.  
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Table 7: Regression of Student Test Scores on Management sub-Components   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Management (Z-Score) 0.050**     
 (0.025)     
Operations (Z-Score)  0.047*    
  (0.027)    
Targets (Z-Score)   0.049**   
   (0.024)   
Monitoring (Z-Score)    0.011  
    (0.019)  
People (Z-Score)     0.044* 
     (0.023) 
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N (Students) 41,818 41,818 41,818 41,818 41,818 
N (Schools) 210 210 210 210 210 
N (Years) 3 3 3 3 3 
R-squared 0.571 0.570 0.571 0.570 0.571 
Notes: Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. The overall management index is the mean of the four 
subcomponents, each separately standardized and entered independently here. School controls include number 
of students, fee rates, ownership, student socioeconomic status, location, and 'noise controls' or enumerator   * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Altonji et al (2005) / Oster (2016) sensitivity analysis 
  
Model with Controls 
 9 0.054 K 0.566 
  
Model without controls 
 9 0.172 K 0.023 
  
Sensitivity Parameters: 
 J(KLMN = 1, 9	 = 0) 0.57 J(KLMN = K×1.3, 9	 = 0) 1.46 
Notes: The sensitivity parameter J is estimated as a function of the coefficient of management on student value-
added 9 and the r-squared K in two models; with and without the full set of control variables.  
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Table 9: Secondary School Enrolment and Dropout Rate 
Year S1 S2 S3 S4 
S1 to S4 
Dropout Rate 
S3 to S4 
Dropout Rate 
2008 291,797      
2009 296,400 280,026     
2010 324,487 277,345 256,385    
2011 320,273 279,267 230,989 222,226 24% 13% 
2012  296,297 259,003 216,754 27% 6% 
2013   284,919 250,274 23% 3% 
2014    268,253 16% 6% 
Notes: Data from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2015 Statistical Abstract. Implied drop-out rates are estimated 
by comparing the total size of each cohort as they progress through time and grades.  
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Table 10: Regression of Test Scores on School Type 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)    
     
Elite Government 1.402*** 0.477*** 0.519*** 0.495*** 
 (0.191) (0.170) (0.141) (0.143)    
Private 0.394*** 0.187*** 0.250*** 0.253*** 
 (0.136) (0.057) (0.060) (0.067)    
Private PPP -0.104 0.056 0.129*** 0.132*** 
 (0.117) (0.054) (0.039) (0.047)    
International PPP 0.153 0.183** 0.213* 0.087    
 (0.155) (0.093) (0.109) (0.128)    
SES (Z-score)   0.129*** 0.119*** 
   (0.042) (0.037)    
Size (Students: z-score)   0.069*** 0.069*** 
   (0.026) (0.024)    
Fees (Z-Score)   0.033 0.035    
   (0.023) (0.023)    
Management (Z-Score)    0.055*   
    (0.029)    
Autonomy Score    0.004    
    (0.021)    
Leadership Score    0.006    
    (0.019)    
Lagged Dep Var  Yes Yes Yes    
Location Controls   Yes Yes    
     
N (Students) 41,818 41,818 41,818 41,818    
N (Schools) 210 210 210 210    
N (Years) 3 3 3 3    
R-squared 0.126 0.539 0.568 0.569    
Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. School controls include size, fees, & student socioeconomic status. 
Location controls include sub-region fixed effects, dummy variables for Kampala/Urban/Rural, and a linear 
distance from Kampala measured in Km.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 11: Mediation Regression of Test Scores on International PPP Schools (Mediated 
by Management Quality) 
 (1) (2) 
ACME (Management) 0.161***  0.183*** 
 (0.033)  (0.036)  
Direct Effect (IPPP) -0.013 -0.099** 
 (0.039)  (0.039)  
Total Effect 0.148***  0.085***  
 (0.213)  (0.022)  
   
Controls  Yes 
Obs. (Students) 40,186 40,186 
Obs. (Schools) 210 210 
% of Tot Effect mediated 1.088 2.153 
H0: ACME=0 0.000 0.000 
Threshold B at which ACME = 0 0.083 0.069 
Notes: The ‘Average Causal Mediation Effect’ (ACME) is the product of the coefficient of management on test 
scores, and international PPP (IPPP) schools on management. The direct effect is the coefficient of IPPP schools 
directly on test scores. The total effect is the sum of the mediation effect and the direct effect. The last row 
reports the threshold value of the unobservable ρ correlation, above which the true ACME would be zero. 
 
 
Table 12: Regression of School Management on School Autonomy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)    
       
Dep Var: 
People Management    
meanautonomy 0.197* 0.148                      
 (0.118) (0.110)                      
academicautonomy   0.052 0.026                    
   (0.078) (0.066)                    
staffautonomy     0.125 0.130 0.466*** 0.448*** 
     (0.087) (0.083) (0.098) (0.102)    
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
School Type  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    
N 210 210 195 195 210 210 210 210    
r2 0.058 0.347 0.045 0.354 0.055 0.349 0.156 0.299    
Notes: Mean autonomy is the average of 7 indicator (dummy) variables for whether the school has autonomy 
over admissions, budgets, hiring, salaries, content, courses, and textbooks. Academic autonomy is the average 
of the autonomy indicators for content, courses, and textbooks. Staffing autonomy is the average of autonomy 
indicator (dummy) variables for whether a school has autonomy over hiring and salary decisions. School 
controls include number of pupils, socioeconomic status, region, urban location, and survey enumerator.    
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 13: Regression of Management Quality on Market Competition  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
Private Dummy -0.160*** -0.201*** -0.159*** -0.153*** -0.140**  
 (0.061) (0.075) (0.059) (0.057) (0.058)    
Schools per capita (Z-Score) -0.006                    
 (0.019)                    
School:Pop Ratio x Private 0.051                    
 (0.035)                    
School Age in Years (Z-Score)  -0.104*                   
  (0.056)                   
School Age x Private  0.212***                   
  (0.073)                   
Distance to NTC (Z-Score)   0.043                  
   (0.042)                  
Distance to NTC x Private   0.025                  
   (0.053)                  
2002 Literacy Rate (Z-Score)    0.159**                 
    (0.079)                 
2002 Literacy x Private    -0.027                 
    (0.104)                 
2002 Enrolment Rate (Z-Score)     0.219*   
     (0.121)    
2002 Enrolment x Private     -0.193    
     (0.159)    
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
N 207 203 210 190 190    
r2 0.078 0.125 0.083 0.093 0.089    
Notes: Schools per capita is defined as the number of schools from the 2013 EMIS system per number of 
population from the 2014 census. School age is taken from our survey. Distance to a National Teacher College 
(NTC) is the minimum distance from a school to one of the 7 NTCs. 2002 literacy and enrolment rates are 
calculated at the sub-county level from the 2002 census for children aged between 5 and 18. School controls 
include number of pupils, socioeconomic status, region, and urban location. 
  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
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Appendix 1: Additional Tables 
 
Table A 1: Score by Individual Management Item   
 
Elite Gov 
(Non-USE) 
Government 
(USE) 
    PPP  
   (USE) 
Private 
(Non-
USE) 
Foreign 
PPP 
(USE) 
All 
Schools 
Operations       
1.Planning 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.3 3.6 2.4 
2. Leading teaching 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.1 3.4 2.1 
3.Personalisation 2.5 1.8 1.8 1.8 3.2 2.0 
4. Assessments & data 2.4 1.9 1.8 1.8 3.1 2.0 
5. Adopting best practice 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.2 2.1 
Monitoring       
6. Identifying problems 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.7 2.2 
7. Performance tracking 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.9 3.4 2.1 
Targets       
8. Target balance 2.6 1.8 1.9 1.8 3.0 2.0 
9. Target Stretch 2.2 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.5 1.7 
10.Accountability 2.3 1.7 1.8 1.7 2.7 1.9 
People        
11. Hiring teachers 1.9 1.9 2.4 2.4 3.2 2.3 
12. Attracting teachers 2.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 3.4 2.3 
13. Rewarding teachers 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.6 2.3 
14. Promoting teachers 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.9 3.1 2.0 
15. Poor performers 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.1 3.3 2.3 
Leadership & Ops       
16.Vision 2.6 2.2 2.0 2.2 3.0 2.2 
17.Budgeting 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 3.0 2.3 
Notes: This table shows average scores by school type for each of the individual sub-component questions that 
make up the overall aggregate management index.  
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Table A 2: School Leadership & Management in PPP Schools 
  None Limited Good N 
Evidence of school vision & 
mission 
Foreign  4 7 11 
Domestic 6 5 5 17 
Evidence of performance 
reviews & feedback 
Foreign   11 11 
Domestic 3 6 8 17 
Source: Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC), 2016 
 
Table A 3: Regression of Student Test Scores on School Management (Comparison of 
OLS and Random Effects Multi-level model) 
 OLS OLS RE RE 
 (1) (2)    (3) (4)    
     
Management (Z-Score) 0.085*** 0.059**  0.062*** 0.059**  
 (0.027) (0.027)    (0.087) (0.027)    
Year FE Yes Yes     Yes    
Prior Test Score Yes Yes    Yes Yes    
Location Controls  Yes     Yes    
School Controls  Yes     Yes    
School Type  Yes     Yes    
     
N (Students) 41,818 41,818    43,156 41,818    
N (Schools) 210 210    223 210    
N (Years) 3 3    3 3    
R-squared 0.529 0.569    0.529 0.569    
Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. School controls include size, fees, & student socioeconomic status. 
Location controls include sub-region fixed effects and dummy variables for Kampala/Urban/Rural.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A 4: Regression of Individual Subject Test Scores on Management  
 Eng Mat Che Phy Bio His Geo Hum    
Management 
(Z-Score) 
0.051*** 0.024 0.008 0.028 0.049** -0.001 0.015 0.028    
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027)    
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
N 42,779 42,745 42,708 42,669 42,657 19,808 19,961 18,890    
N_clust 223 223 223 223 223 204 204 203    
R-squared 0.512 0.440 0.341 0.421 0.477 0.415 0.469 0.473  
Dep var Mean 7.2 6.7 8.2 8.2 7.8 6.7 6.8 6.8  
Dep var St Dev 1.7 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.4 2.2 1.7 1.7  
Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. School controls include size, fees, & student socioeconomic status. 
Location controls include sub-region fixed effects and dummy variables for Kampala/Urban/Rural.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table A 5: Regression of Student Test Scores on the Dobbie-Fryer Index  
 VA VA VA VA    
     
Dobbie-Fryer Index (Z-Score) 0.051*** 0.041*                  
 (0.018) (0.022)                  
Management Index (Z-Score)   0.064*** 0.054**  
   (0.020) (0.022)    
School Controls No Yes No Yes    
     
N (Students) 43,570 43,570 43,570 43,570    
N (Schools) 223 223 223 223    
R-squared 0.521 0.566 0.522 0.566    
Notes: The “Dobbie-Fryer index” is our best approximation to the 5 key practices included in their actual index, 
taken from our school management survey. These include the sub-questions on data-driven teaching, the 
adoption of best practices, personalization of teaching, and leadership).  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A 6: Heterogeneous effects of Management on Student Value-Added, by Student 
Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    
      
Management (Z-Score) 0.066** 0.120* 0.051**                  
 (0.030) (0.071) (0.024)                  
Female x Mgmt -0.014                    
 (0.018)                    
PLE x Mgmt  0.003                   
  (0.002)                   
PLE Division 1 x Mgmt   0.062                  
   (0.046)                  
Targets (Z-Score)    0.161*** 0.057**  
    (0.061) (0.024)    
PLE x Targets    0.008**                 
    (0.004)                 
PLE Division 1 x Targets     0.020    
     (0.020)    
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
      
N (Students) 41,818 41,818 41,818 41,818 41,818    
N (Schools) 210 210 210 210 210    
N (Years) 3 3 3 3 3    
R-squared 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.569    
Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. PLE is a continuous variable with an aggregate points score ranging 
from 4 to 28. PLE Division 1 is a dummy variable for whether the student obtained the top grade in their 
primary exam. The positive coefficient on the interaction of PLE scores with Targets indicates that the effect of 
secondary school target-setting practice is greater for students with better expected test scores (based on their 
primary test score). School controls include number of students, fee rates, ownership, student socioeconomic 
status, location, and 'noise controls' or enumerator  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A 7: Heterogeneous effects of Management on Student Value-Added, by School 
Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
       
Management (Z-Score) 0.064** 0.062** 0.060** 0.067*** 0.062** 0.070*** 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)    
Urban x Mgmt -0.070                      
 (0.073)                      
Students x Mgmt  -0.010                     
  (0.033)                     
SES x Mgmt   0.045                    
   (0.030)                    
Dropout rate (Z-Score)    0.038                   
    (0.025)                   
Dropouts x Mgmt    0.080***                   
    (0.028)                   
Tuition Fees x Mgmt     0.023                  
     (0.034)                  
School Age x Mgmt      0.036    
      (0.032)    
School Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
       
N (Students) 41,818 41,818 41,818 40,067 41,818 39,781    
N (Schools) 210 210 210 205 210 203    
N (Years) 3 3 3 3 3 3    
R-squared 0.569 0.569 0.569 0.558 0.569 0.561    
Std. Err. adjusted for 210 school clusters. Urban and Peri-Urban are dummy variables. School controls include 
number of students, fee rates, ownership, student socioeconomic status, location, and 'noise controls' or survey 
enumerator  * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A 8: Selection regression of Choice to Participate in the Management Survey on 
School Characteristics 
 OLS Probit Logit 
Number of Students (2015) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Socioeconomic Status -0.036 -0.092 -0.148 
 (0.038) (0.096) (0.155) 
Urban (Dummy) -0.055 -0.143 -0.229 
 (0.088) (0.224) (0.360) 
Average Fees -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Headteacher Experience (yrs) 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.018) 
1 Postgrad / 0 Grad 0.059 0.167 0.256 
 (0.065) (0.170) (0.273) 
Sub-Region FE YES YES YES 
N 324 324 324 
r2 0.023   
Note: None of the 11 sub-Region dummies are statistically significant in any of the specifications.  
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 2: Edits to original World Management Survey 
The original World Management Survey schools instrument includes a rubric with level 
descriptors for 1 (worst), 3, and 5 (best).  The approach proposed by Lemos and Scur (2016) 
designed specifically for developing countries includes both a horizontal and vertical 
expansion of the tool, with level descriptors for half point levels at the bottom end of the 
scale (1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 4, 5) in order to capture variation in countries where scores are 
clustered at the lower end of scale, and including 3 separate sub-areas within each of the 20 
question areas. During our piloting we decided to expand the original rubric to include level 
descriptors for each of the levels 1 - 5, and to allow enumerators to score 0.5 points where 
they felt that responses fell between the two level descriptions, rather than describing 
explicitly what the 0.5 points were in the rubric. We also opted to maintain the shorter set of 
20 areas rather than expanding to 60, on the grounds that any possible sacrifice in precision 
here could be outweighed by preventing respondent fatigue. During pre-testing and piloting 
we also opted to further simplify the original list of 20 areas to a combined and shortened list 
of 11 areas, to reduce excessive duplication and repetition of questioning and to limit the 
length of time required from a school head teacher. These changes are summarized in Error! 
Reference source not found. below. Our full survey instrument with the rubric of level 
descriptors is included at Appendix 3.  
 
 
 2 
Table A 9: Summary of Changes to Original World Management Survey 
Original WMS Adapted Uganda Instrument Rationale for changes 
A. Operations 
Standardisation of Instructional 
Planning  
Original category 
retained Original categories retained. New category added to capture important 
school management role missing 
from original survey 
Personalisation of Instruction and 
Learning 
Data-Driven Planning  
Adopting Educational Best Practices 
 
Instructional 
Leadership  
(New category) 
B. Monitoring 
Continuous Improvement Original category retained 
One category retained unchanged, 
the remaining four categories 
combined into one. In pre-testing we 
found that these questions/categories 
were very repetitive and overlapping 
and combined aspects of the 
categories into questions within a 
single category 
Performance Tracking 
Categories 
combined 
 
Performance Review 
Performance Dialogue 
Consequence Management 
C. Target Setting 
Target Balance Categories 
combined 
One category retained unchanged. 
Two categories combined into one 
where there is overlap. Some aspects 
of target interconnection were not 
relevant in this context – for example 
there are no district or national 
targets with which school targets 
could be interconnected. Two 
categories omitted. In pre-testing we 
found that these questions/categories 
were very repetitive providing little 
new information 
Target Interconnection 
Target Stretch Original category retained 
Target Time Horizon 
Categories 
omitted  
Target Clarity & Comparability 
D. People Management 
 Recruitment  (new category) 
Category added from Lemos & Scur 
(2016) 
Rewarding High Performers Original category 
retained  Fixing Poor Performers 
Promoting High Performers 
Categories 
combined 
Categories combined due to overlap 
and repetition in questions.  
Continuing Professional 
Development 
Retaining High Performers 
Attracting High Performers  Original category retained  
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Appendix 3: Survey Instrument: World Management Survey, Uganda Adaptation, January 2016 
 
1. Basic school details  
 
    
School name   Ark code    
Interviewee name   Interviewee position  
Interviewee email     
      
2. Main Management Survey Questions 
 
Area Topic Uganda questions Scoring rubric 
1.
 O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
WMS 1: 
planning of 
teaching and the 
curriculum 
 
Tests how well 
materials and 
practices are 
standardisd and 
aligned in order 
to be capable of 
moving students 
through learning 
pathways over 
time 
• How do you 
ensure that all teachers 
cover all the curriculum 
topics?  
• Do teachers 
make lesson plans or 
schemes of work? 
• Are these 
schemes or plans fixed 
at the start of term or do 
they change throughout 
the year? 
• How do you 
keep track of what 
teachers are doing in 
the classrooms? 
1: No clear planning processes or protocols exist; little verification or follow up is done to 
ensure consistency across classrooms 
2: Schemes of work prepared by all teachers and checked at beginning of term; likely to be 
some lessons plans in place; no flexibility to meet student needs; little monitoring throughout 
the term 
3: School has defined process for developing schemes of work and lesson plans; they are 
prepared by all teachers and checked at beginning of term; they have some flexibility to meet 
student needs; monitoring is only adequate (ie. a few times throughout term) 
4: Teachers are encouraged to adapt some lesson plans throughout the term and there frequent 
monitoring through different means (i.e. lesson observations, checking student books)  
5: School has a defined process for developing schemes of work; All teachers are encouraged 
to continually adapt their lesson plans, based on student performance; there’s a regular 
dialogue with teacher and senior management about lesson content/curriculum coverage.  
 4 
Area Topic Uganda questions Scoring rubric 
2.
 O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
WMS New: 
Leading quality 
teaching 
 
Tests the extent to 
which school 
leaders take an 
active role in 
leading the 
quality of 
teaching and 
learning 
• Do you or a 
member of your senior 
team observe lessons? 
• How often? 
• What would you 
expect to see when 
observing lessons? 
• How would you 
support a teacher to 
improve after observing 
their lesson?  
1: Very limited lesson observations take place; focus is on compliance (eg curriculum 
coverage or behavior) rather than quality of pedagogy. 
2: Head teacher and Leadership team observes teachers in an ad-hoc, unstructured way; 
some feedback may be provided 
3: Head teacher and Leadership team observes teachers in a structured way (such as weekly); 
feedback and support is provided to help majority of teachers improve.  
4: School leader sets expectations for teaching practice; leadership regularly observes 
teachers in a structured way; feedback and support is provided, which can help teachers to 
improve 
5: School leader sets high quality expectations for teaching practice; leadership regularly 
observes teachers in a structured way; clear feedback and support is provided to help all 
teachers to improve  
3.
 O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
WMS 2: 
Personalisation 
of instruction 
and learning 
 
Tests for 
flexibility in 
teaching methods 
and student 
involvement 
ensuring all 
individuals can 
master the 
learning 
objectives 
• How do your 
teachers make sure that 
all students including 
those that may be 
struggling have 
understood the lesson? 
• How do teachers 
ensure that students 
actively participate in 
their learning? 
• Are there any 
remedial classes or 
support for students 
outside lessons? 
• Are remedial 
lessons for all, or only 
for lower performing 
students? 
1: Teachers lead learning with very low involvement of students, there is little or no 
identification of diverse student needs. Booster classes are for all students, not targeted. 
2: There are some 'add-on' strategies put in place to support struggling students, such as 
targeted booster classes or remedial lessons, (rather than embedded within lessons). Limited 
active participation of students in lessons. 
3: There are remedial lessons, and some evidence of in-class strategies to make sure all 
students are learning in classroom and actively participating (maybe through group work, 
continuous assessment) 
4: There are a range of techniques used to differentiate instruction and promote active 
participation in learning, and ensure that lessons are appropriate for a range of student groups 
within in the class. 
5: Emphasis is placed on personalization of instruction based on student needs; school 
encourages student involvement and participation in classrooms; school provides information 
and connects students and parents to resources to support learning. 
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4.
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WMS 3: 
Assessments and 
data driven 
planning 
 
Tests if the school 
uses assessment 
to verify learning 
outcomes at 
critical stages, 
making data 
easily available 
and adapting 
student strategies 
accordingly 
• What type of 
information on each 
individual student’s 
ability is available to 
teachers at the 
beginning of the 
academic year?  
• How do you 
track the progress of 
each student throughout 
the year? 
• How is data 
used by teachers? 
1: Little or no effort is made to provide new teachers with information about students as they 
move through the school; no culture of reviewing student data throughout the year.  
2: Schools track some performance data about students, but it is not frequent (perhaps only 
at the end of the year or term), data is often not easy to use and it is often high level (i.e. pass 
or fail) 
3: Schools may understand the importance of tracking student performance as they move 
through school, but they do not have consistent processes in place. Some data available 
throughout the year but not easy to interpret or understand, and will sometimes inform 
teaching practice (i.e. re-teaching a topic) 
4: Data is used regularly to guide planning and teaching (not just the typical BoT, MoT and 
EoT exams); Data is used to understand areas of strength and weakness, and teaching is 
adapted on the basis of this information. 
5: Students progress is managed in an integrated and proactive manner, supported by 
formative assessments tightly linked to expectations; data is widely available and easy to use  
5.
 O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
WMS 4: 
Adopting 
education best 
practices 
 
Tests how well the 
school 
incorporates 
teaching best 
practices and the 
sharing of these 
resources into the 
classroom  
• How do teachers 
learn about new 
education best-
practices?  
• How do you 
encourage the teachers 
to incorporate new 
teaching practices into 
the classroom?  
• How are these 
learnings shared across 
the school?  
1: Teachers do not go on courses and there is no convincing explanation of how teachers are 
encouraged to improve.  
2: Teachers go on training courses (i.e. SESMAT, government refresher courses, etc.), or the 
school actively tries to take forward new approaches, but no clear system for sharing or 
monitoring improved practices.  
3: Teachers go on training courses, learn from other high performing schools, or are 
encouraged to adopt new techniques. There is a proper system for them to share the 
learnings of the training with their colleagues and some monitoring afterwards.  
4: Teachers use a range of techniques to find out about best practice, share with colleagues in 
the school, with regular monitoring by the DoS/HT (to ensure they’re using the training). 
Some culture of learning and sharing best practices amongst the staff 
5: Teachers go on training, share with colleagues, are followed up on, and get additional 
school based training from HT/DOS. Strong culture of learning and sharing amongst the staff; 
leadership encourage staff to collaborate, sometimes beyond the school, and share best 
practices.  
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WMS 5: 
Identifying and 
responding to 
problems 
 
Tests attitudes 
towards 
continuous 
improvement 
• When you have 
a problem in the school, 
how do you come to 
know about them? For 
example, if student 
attendance falls one 
week? 
• What steps do 
you take to fix them 
and how do you ensure 
they don’t happen 
again? (maybe ask for 
an example of when 
something went wrong 
and what they did?) 
1: Exposing and solving problems (for the school, individual students and teachers) is 
unstructured; no improvements are made to the process to stop problems happening again.  
2: There is not a clear and consistent process for identifying and solving problems. School 
leaders sometimes involve a range of people and put in place a considered solution, but other 
problems are not treated in a structured way. 
3: There is an established way of exposing and solving problems, but not always at an early 
stage;  resolution of the problem involves most of the appropriate staff groups. 
4: There is a structured process for solving a problem; appropriate people are involved and 
school leaders are proactive to find and expose problems; mechanisms are in place to learn 
the lessons from problems that have arisen. 
5: Exposing and solving problems in a structured way is integral to individual’s 
responsibilities, and resolution involves all appropriate people; resolution of problems is 
performed as part of regular management processes. 
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WMS 6,7 and 8: 
Performance 
tracking, review 
and dialogue 
 
Tests whether 
school 
performance is 
measured, 
reviewed and 
discussed and 
followed up with 
the right 
frequency, and to 
a high quality 
• What kind of 
things do you measure 
to track school 
performance? How 
often are these 
measured?  
• Are these 
recorded in a strategic 
plan or school 
development plan?  
• Do you have 
meetings to review 
progress against the 
indicators?  
• Tell me about 
these meetings – who 
goes, and how do you 
agree follow up 
actions?  
• How do you 
review school 
performance with 
parents and the 
community?   
1: Measures tracked do not indicate if overall objectives are met; performance is reviewed 
infrequently or in an un-meaningful way; the right data is not available. 
2: Some useful performance indicators are tracked, including on students academic 
performance. Indicators are, based on accurate but limited data; reviews are confined to the 
senior management and can be superficial, without stimulating any action.  
3: Performance indicators are tracked and reviewed formally using appropriate data (such as 
4-5 targets, tracked at least termly); limited formal documentation; review is predominantly by 
the senior management, and sometimes focus on identifying the cause of the problem or 
problem solving. 
4: Performance indicators are regularly tracked, and reviews involve a range of relevant 
staff. They are clearly documented and made visible to key stakeholders for example, the 
community. Attempts are made to use review meetings to solve problems. 
5: Performance is continuously tracked, both formally and informally, using good quality 
management tools. Results are communicated to all staff; meetings are used to solve problems 
and provide feedback 
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WMS 10 and 12: 
Balance of 
targets/metrics 
 
Tests whether the 
system tracks 
meaningful 
targets tied to 
student outcomes 
and whether this 
is approach is 
rational and 
appropriate 
• Do you have 
any targets? 
• Are your targets 
linked to student 
outcomes? 
• Can you tell me 
about any specific goals 
for departments or 
teachers  
• Can you tell me 
about any specific goals 
for students? S1-S3, 
and S4?  
1: Performance targets are very loosely defined or not defined at all.  
2: Performance targets for the school exist but are high level: usually confined to number of 
Division 1 grades in the school, or not linked directly to outcomes (such as attendance or 
enrolment) 
3: Performance metrics and targets are defined for the school and teachers, based on student 
results. S4 students should also have individual targets.  
4: Performance metrics are defined for the school and teachers bsased on student results. 
Targets are in place for all students, including those in S1-S3. Targets are based on good data 
about on-going student performance, such as robust end of term tests. 
5: Performance measures are defined for all, and they include measures of student outcomes 
and other important factors linked to outcomes (i.e. attendance). When they are combined, 
specific short term targets are designed to meet long term goals. 
9.
 T
ar
ge
t s
et
tin
g 
WMS 13: Target 
Stretch 
 
Tests whether 
targets are 
appropriately 
difficult to 
achieve 
• Do you usually 
meet your targets? 
• How do you 
decide how difficult to 
make your targets?  
• Do you feel that 
all the department/areas 
have targets that are just 
as hard? Or would some 
areas/departments get 
easier targets?  
1: Goals are either too easy or impossible to achieve; at least in part because they are set with 
little teacher involvement or no use of data.  
2: Some targets are put in place based on consideration of a limited range of relevant data, 
such as looking at ability of current cohort and previous year’s results. No benchmarking. 
3: Some carefully considered and clear targets in place, taking into account some evidence; 
targets dictated by head teacher, with little buy-in from teachers and limited external 
benchmarking.  
4: Targets are in place, based on a range of evidence, including some external benchmarks. 
Targets are adapted for different parts of the school (for example, in particular subjects or for 
particular student cohorts), rather than a ‘one-size fits all’ approach.  
5: Targets are genuinely demanding whilst still realistic for all parts of the organisation; goals 
are set in consultation with senior staff, and consider external benchmarks where appropriate. 
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WMS 22: 
Clearly defined 
accountability 
 
Tests whether 
school leaders 
are accountable 
for delivery of 
student outcomes 
• Who is 
responsible for 
delivering the schools’ 
targets? 
• What would 
happen if that person 
did not meet the 
targets?   
• How would you 
respond to a complaint 
from a parent about 
their child's lessons? 
 1: School leaders feel accountable for minimal targets or not at all, without individual or 
school level consequences for good or bad performance; school leaders have very limited 
sense of personal responsibility, rather seeing the whole team as accountable for 
performance.  
2: School leaders feel accountable for performance; there are some consequences for good 
and bad performance, but they may not be clear or consistently applied. Limited sense of 
personal responsibility.  
3: School leaders feel accountable for student outcomes, and there are some school-level and 
individual consequences for good and bad performance. School leaders are clear that they are 
ultimately accountable for reaching some minimal targets.  
4: School leaders feel accountable for a range of outcomes, with clearly defined 
consequences for good and bad performance.   
5: School leaders feel accountable for all elements of school performance (i.e. quality, equity, 
operations and cost effectiveness), with clearly defined consequences for good and bad 
performance. Leaders take clear personal responsibility for meeting the outcomes.  
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WMS 18: 
Recruiting staff 
 
Tests how well the 
school identifies 
and targets 
needed teaching,  
and other 
capacity in the 
school,and how 
they find the right 
teachers  
• Who decides 
how many and which 
teachers (full- time 
regular members of 
staff) to hire?  
• Where do you 
seek out and find 
teachers? 
• What criteria do 
you use to hire 
teachers?  
1: The school has very limited or no control over recruitment of staff (teachers are assigned 
to the school). Or, there is discrimation in the recruitment process 
2: The school has some control over recruitment, but there is no standard process.  
3: The school controls the number and which individual teachers are hired, and has an 
interview process for new teachers, but the criteria are based primarily on 
experience/qualifications rather than on proven teaching ability or knowledge.  
4: The school controls the number of teachers that are hired and has a clear interview process, 
which sometimes or occasionally goes beyond just interview. 
5: The school has a clear recruitment process including direct testing of teachers on their 
teaching ability and subject knowledge (e.g. by a lesson observation). 
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WMS 20: 
Attracting talent 
 
Tests how strong 
the teacher value 
proposition is to 
work in the 
individual school  
• What are the 
benefits of working at 
your school? 
• Why would a 
very good teacher want 
to work at your school, 
rather than another one? 
• Are these 
benefits communicated 
to teachers? 
1. There are no particular benefits to working at this school. The head teacher cannot 
articulate why a teacher would choose to work in their school  
2. There are no or limited formal benefits (good pay, etc), but the school offer some 
informal benefits such as a nice atmosphere. 
3: There are some formal benefits associated with working at this school  The head teacher 
can articulate a clear reason why a teacher would choose their school, and make some efforts 
to communicate this to teachers. 
4. The school offers a range of benefits for working at the school, which is clearly 
communicated. 
5: The school offers a wide range of reasons and benefits of why a teacher would choose their 
school (for example, pay, development, meals and housing), Teachers are clearly told about 
these benefits, and there are opportunities for feedback from teachers. 
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WMS 15: 
Rewarding high 
performance 
 
Tests whether 
good teacher 
performance is 
rewarded 
proportionately 
• How do you 
know who your best 
teachers are? 
• What criteria do 
you use and how often 
do you identify these 
teachers?  
• What types of 
rewards are given to 
teachers for good 
performance? Any 
monetary or non 
monetary rewards?  
1: There is no teacher evaluation system. Teachers are paid and rewarded in the same way no 
matter how well they teach.  
2: There is no formal teacher evaluation system, but good performance is sometimes 
rewarded.   
3: There is a basic teacher evaluation system that rewards good performance (with extra 
payment and/or other benefits). Reward is typically based on a simple calculation about high 
UCE scores, such as number of distinctions. 
4: There is a teacher evaluation system that rewards good performance, at least termly.  There 
is some kind of process for evaluating teachers throughout the year that goes beyond exam 
scores, and some consideration is given to ensure the reward system is fair for teachers across 
different grades and subjects.  
5: There is a structured, ongoing teacher evaluation system throughout the year that rewards 
good performance.    Rewards are awarded as a consequence of well-defined and monitored 
individual achievements (such as good class test scores) 
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WMS 17: 
Promoting high 
performers 
 
Tests whether 
staff promotions 
and career 
progression are 
based on 
performance 
• What types of 
career and teacher 
development 
opportunities are 
provided?  
• How do you 
decide who goes on 
which courses? 
• How do you 
make decisions about 
promotion/progression 
of teachers within the 
school?  
• If you had a 
DOS vacancy, how 
would you decide 
which teacher gets the 
job?  
1: Teachers are promoted primarily on the basis of tenure (e.g. years of service). Development 
opportunities rarely available beyond free government courses 
2: Teachers are usually promoted on the basis of tenure, but sometimes on performance. 
Development opportunities are sometimes available but these are usually government/NGO 
run courses.  
3: Teachers are usually promoted on the basis of performance.   In addition to government 
courses, the school provides career development opportunities (i.e. school running their own 
CPD sessions) but teaches are often chosen based on non-performance related factors.  
4: Teachers are promoted on the basis of performance, and development opportunities are 
actively encouraged and made available for good performers.  
5: The school actively identifies, develops and promotes its top performing staff members with 
a clear career path for progression 
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WMS 16: 
Removing poor 
performers 
 
Tests whether the 
school is able to 
deal with 
underperformers - 
both in terms of 
teachers 
struggling with 
teaching and non-
compliance (i.e. 
poor attendance) 
• How do you 
know who are the 
teachers who are not 
doing so well (the worst 
teachers)? 
• What would you 
do if you had a teacher 
who was trying hard but 
struggling to teach 
well?  
• What would you 
do if you had a teacher 
who was lazy and not 
committed to their job? 
• Have you ever 
removed a teacher for 
poor performance?  
 1: There is no structured way of monitoring performance of teachers. Poor quality teaching/ 
poor attendance is not addressed or inconsistently addressed.   Poor performers are rarely 
removed from their positions  
2:  Poor  teaching/poor attendance is sometimes addressed, but rarely in a structured way (for 
example, teachers are given a letter giving notice to improve, but aren’t given support). There 
is no disciplinary process for poor attendance. Firing a poor teacher is hard for the head 
teacher and therefore rarely happens. 
3: Poor teaching is addressed, but typically through a limited range of methods (e.g. 
coaching).  There is a process to address low attendance.  Firing a poor teacher is usually 
hard and therefore rarely happens.  
4: Poor teaching is addressed, and often through range of targeted interventions (eg team 
teaching, extra CPD training, performance appraisals). Poor performers are sometimes but 
not always moved out of the school when weaknesses cannot be overcome. 
5: Repeated poor teaching is consistently and systematically addressed through a range of 
targeted interventions (eg team teaching, extra CPD training, performance appraisals). Poor 
performers are moved out of the school when weaknesses cannot be overcome. 
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WMS 21: 
Leadership 
vision 
 
Tests whether 
school leaders 
have an 
understanding of 
the broader set of 
challenges that 
the school, system 
and key actors 
face and the right 
mindset to 
address them  
• What is the 
school’s vision for the 
next 5 years? 
• Who is involve 
deciding the vision? 
• How do 
teachers, staff and 
others involved in the 
school matters know 
and understand this 
vision? 
• Do you use the 
vision to influence the 
everyday life of the 
school? 
 1: The school has no clear vision, or one defined without much collaboration from 
teacher/parent/student/community.  The school leader does not or cannot articulate a clear 
focus on building an environment conducive to learning. 
2: The school has a vision statement, focused primarily on one aspect of schooling such as 
exam.   Teachers/parents/students/community have a weak understanding of the vision.  
3: School has defined a vision that focuses on improvement in student outcomes, beyond just 
exam results, and usually defined with limited stakeholder collaboration. School leaders 
may focus on the quality of the overall school environment, but often in response to specific 
issues.  
4: School has defined a vision that focuses on improvement in student outcomes, beyond just 
exam results. Teachers and parents are involved in defining this vision, which is somewhat 
responsive to local needs.  
5: School leaders define and broadly communicate a shared vision and purpose for the school 
that focuses on improving student learning and outcomes beyond just exam results. Vision and 
purpose is built upon a keen understanding of student and community needs, and defined 
collaboratively with a wide range of stakeholders. The school leader proactively builds 
environment conducive to learning. 
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WMS New: 
Budgeting  
 
Tests whether the 
school has 
processes for 
planning, 
monitoring and 
adjusting their 
budgets 
• Do you prepare 
a budget for the school? 
• How do you 
plan the spending of 
your budget? 
• How do you 
make sure you don’t 
overspend or 
underspend each year?  
1: No clear process for preparing or monitoring budgets.  
2: Some process for preparing budgets with some link to school needs, monitoring is limited 
throughout the year 
3: Clear process for preparing budgets, some monitoring throughout the year, some 
possibility to reforecast to cover over/underspends.  
4: Clear process for preparing budgets, monitoring throughout the year; different scenarios 
planned for.  
5: Clear process for preparing budgets; different scenarios planned for (increase/decrease in 
income); budget regularly reviewed by senior leadership; process for reforecasting; effectively 
managed to avoid overspend  
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3. Organisational questions 
Ask these questions after the main World Management Survey questions.  
 
Topic Question 
1. Head teacher 
absenteeism 
1.1 Do you have a second job?  (Yes or No) 
2. Fees 
 
What school fees do you 
charge for DAY students 
per term for: 
2.1 Regular Tuition (UGX) 
2.2 Remedial or booster classes (UGX) 
2.3 Uniform (UGX) 
2.4 School lunch (UGX) 
2.5 Other out of pocket expenses (UGX) 
2.6 Total (UGX) 
3. Admissions 3.1 Do you use academic criteria to select students for 
admissions? (Yes or No) 
4. Headteacher time 
 
On average throughout 
the school year, what 
percentage of time in your 
role as a principal do you 
spend on the following 
tasks at school  
 
(Rough estimates are 
sufficient. Please write a 
number in each row.  
Write 0 (zero) if none.  
Please ensure that 
responses add up to 
100%.): 
4.1 Administrative and leadership tasks and meetings 
(including human resource/personnel issues, regulations, reports, 
school budget, preparing timetables and class composition, 
strategic planning, leadership and management activities, 
responding to requests from district, regional, state, or national 
education officials 
4.2 Curriculum and teaching related tasks and meetings 
(Including developing curriculum, teaching, classroom 
observations, student evaluation, mentoring teachers, teacher 
professional development) 
4.3 Student interactions (including counselling and 
conversations outside structured learning activities, discipline) 
4.4 Income related activities (school fee collection, fundraising, 
obtaining government capitation grant, etc) 
4.5 Other 
5. Autonomy 
 
In your school, who has 
main authority for: 
 
(1 = Headteacher.   
 2 = Owner / Director.    
 3 = Ministry of 
Education.   
 4 = School Governing 
Board.    
 5 = Teachers.    
 6 = Other) 
a. Admissions criteria 
b. Deciding which courses are offered;  
c. Determining subject content;  
d. Choosing which textbooks are used;  
e. Selecting teachers for hire;  
f. Establishing teachers' starting salaries; and  
g. Deciding on budget allocations within the school.  
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Topic Question 
6. Ownership 6.1 Is the school for profit or not for profit? (P or N) 
6.2 Does the school have a religious affiliation?  
1=Not religious 
2=Pentecostal 
3=Catholic 
4=Hindu 
5=Jesuit 
6=Seventh Day Adventist 
7=Mormon 
8=Muslim 
9=Protestant 
10=other 
6.3 If yes, do you receive any funding from the church/mosque? 
(Yes or No) 
6.4 What proportion of your school budget is this? (1-100%) 
7. Human Resources 7.1 Percentage of teachers who are union members (1-100%) 
7.2 Average classroom teaching hours per day by teachers  
(No. of hours) 
7.3 Percentage of teachers who have left the school in the past 
12 months (% teachers) 
8. Exam prep 8.1 What percentage of time do S4 students spend practising 
exam questions? 
9. Self-evaluation 9.1 How well managed do you think the rest of the school is on a 
scale of 1-10, where 1 is worst, 10 is best practice and 5 is 
average? (1-10) 
 
4. Post interview questions 
Fill in these questions yourself after the interview has finished 
Question Answer options 
Interview duration (mins) No. of minutes 
Interviewee willingness to 
reveal information 
1: Very reluctant to provide more than basic information 
3: Provides all basic info & some more confidential information 
5: Totally willing to provide any information about the school 
Interviewee knowledge of 
management practices 
1: Some knowledge of their school and no knowledge of its 
daily operations 
3: Expert knowledge of his school, and some knowledge of its 
daily operations 
5: Expert knowledge about his school and its daily operations 
Interviewee patience 1: Little patience – wants to run the interview as quickly as 
possible. I felt heavy time pressure 
3: Some patience – willing to provide richness to answers but 
also time constrained. I felt moderate time pressure 
5: Lot of patience – willing to talk for as long as required. I felt 
no time pressure 
 
